RECENT CASES
Bills and Notes-Joint and Several Obligation-[lllinois].-A promissory note was,
by its terms, joint and several. The second paragraph of the note provided" ...
the
makers and all endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment ....
and
....
authority is hereby irrevocably given to any attorney of any court of record
....
[to] confess judgment against the undersigned .... " The note was signed by
two persons and judgment was confessed against one of the two signers. Held, the
warrant of attorney, like the note itself, was several as well as joint, and judgment was
properly confessed against one of the two signers. Farmer'sExchange Bank of Elvaston
v. Sollars, 353 Il. 224, 187 N.E. 289 (1033).
The power to confess a judgment must be clearly given and strictly pursued, and if
power is given to confess judgment against the promisors jointly, a confession of judgment against one severally will render the confession and judgment on it void. Keen
v. Bump, 286 M. 1i, 121 N.E. 251 (1918), W1ells v. DurstChevrolet Co., 341 Ill. 1O8, 173
N.E. 92 (193-). Apparently the Illinois statute requiring that "all joint obligations and
covenants shall be taken and held to be joint and several obligations and covenants"
does not apply to confessions of judgment. Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 76, § 3;
see Keen v. Bump, 286 Ill. 1i, 121 N.E. 251 (1918). That a note is in terms joint and
several will not authorize a several judgment against one of the makers on a joint confession of judgment clause. Mayer v. Pick, 192 Ill. 561, 61 N.E. 416 (ioil).
In Mayer v. Pick, 192 Ill. 561, 61 N.E. 416 (igol) the confession of judgment was
held joint where the language of the confession was "we authorize," even though the
note was joint and several. The court distinguished the present case from the Mayer
case because of the use of the words "the undersigned" (which might refer to each
signer) in the confession clause, and of the word "severally" in the preceding waiver of
presentment clause.
TELFOID F. HOLLMAN

Certiorari-Scope of Review-Revocation of Medical License-[llinois].-Proceedings were instituted under the Medical Practice Act, Ill. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat.
(1933), c. 91, § 16a(3), to revoke the defendant's license to practice medicine, charging
him with gross malpractice, resulting in the permanent injury of a patient. Certiorari
to review an order of the Medical Committee revoking defendant's license was quashed,
and defendant appealed. Held, reversed and remanded, on the ground that the committee in making its order had adopted an erroneous rule of law. Schireson v. Walsh,
354 IMl. 40, 187 N.E. 921 (1933).
Briefs filed in the case reveal that the record brought up contained findings by a
committee of physicians that the patient was diagnosed for bow legs by means of a
photograph, despite the fact that the only proper method of diagnosis was by X-ray or
fluoroscope; that even the photograph did not reveal a case of bow legs; yet the'defendant performed an unnecessary operation, which eventually necessitated the amputation of both legs. In finding the defendant guilty as charged, the committee applied
8o1
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the rule that when a physician proclaims himself as a skillful plastic surgeon, a much
higher degree of skill and ability is demanded of him than of the average physician.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the judgment and order of the committee on certiorari, held that an erroneous standard of skill had been applied and that where an
order of an administrative bodyis based upon an incorrect rule of law, such order must
be set aside, regardless of the evidence introduced.
The problem of the scope of the review on certiorariis fairly presented by this decision, since an appeal from a judgment on certiorari can be no more extensive in its
review than certiorariitself. Minaker v. Adams, 55 Cal. App. 374, 203 Pac. 8o6 (1921).
The scope of the writ of certiorarihas been restricted or enlarged either by judicial definition or statute. See 24 Mich. L. Rev. 844 (1926); 36 Yale L. Jour. 1017 (1927);
Freund, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property (1927), 240-242. Some
courts adhere to the conservative notion that on certiorariinquiry will be made only
into defects and errors which concern the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal. Tin v.
United States DistrictCourt, 148 Cal. 773, 84 Pac. 152 (19o6); Minaker v. Adams, 55 Cal.

App. 374, 203 Pac. 8o6 (1921); Mays v. DistrictCourt, 40 Ida. 798, 237 Pac. 700 (1925).
But the meaning of the concept "jurisdiction" is elusive; it has been held that where
the finding has no support in the testimony, there was no jurisdiction to make it. InternationalHarvester Co. v. Industrial Commission, 157 Wis. 167, 147 N.W. 53 (1914).

Many jurisdictions hold that the office of certiorariis also to review questions of irregularity in the proceedings, i.e., whether the tribunal proceeded according to the
legal forms prescribed by statute or common law. Ex parte Big Four Coal Mining Co.,
213 Ala. 305, 104 So. 764 (1925); First Nat'l Bank v. Gibbs, 78 Fla. 118, 82 So. 618
(1919); People v. Lindblom, 182 Ill. 241, 55 N.E. 358 (1899); Barry v. District Court,
167 Iowa 306, 149 N.W. 449 (1914); State ex rel. Matrangav.Judgeof Crimn. DistrictCt.,
42 La. 3089, 8 So. 277 (I89o); Garnseyv. County Court, 33 Ore. 201, 54 Pac. 539 (1898).
See also Doran v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 78 Colo. 153, 24o Pac. 335 (1925),
where, under the writ, the court may inquire into "abuse of discretion."
A more liberal treatment of the writ has made certiorariconcurrent with appeal or
writ of error, to bring up all errors of law, i.e., where the evidence is such that it will not
justify the findings as a legitimate inference from the facts proved; where the action of
the tribunal is based upon an erroneous application of the law to the findings; and
where evidence is improperly admitted or excluded. Harwell v. Marshall, 125 Ga. 451,
54 S.E. 93 (igo6); Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. iii (i86o); Mayor of Medford v. Judge of
Court, 249 Mass. 465, 144 N.E. 397 (1924); People ex rel. Cook v. Board of Police, 39
N.Y. 5o6 (1868); Dryden v. Swinburne, 20 W.Va. 89 (1882).

The broadest application of the writ was effected under the New York Civil Practice
Act (6th ed. 1931), § 304, permitting a review of the weight or preponderance of the
evidence in all certiorariproceedings; and under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
Act, Ill. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 48, § x5b, f, providing for inquiry into all
questions of law and fact presented by the record in such proceedings. Otis Elevator
Co. v. Industria Commission, 302 Ill. 90, 134 N.E. 19 (1922). The principal case holds
that certiorarimay properly review an erroneous application of the law to the findings.
Inasmuch as the proceedings here were prescribed by the Medical Practice Act which
directs certiorarias the proper remedy but does not purport to define its scope, the common law writ apparently was intended. Yet a long line of Illinois decisions have established that the ruling of the lower court upon the law and the application of the law to
the facts in the rendition of a judgment cannot be reviewed on common law certiorari,
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whose restricted province is an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court, and the legal
form of the court's proceedings. Hamilton v. Harwood, 113 Ill. 154 (1885); People v.
Lindblom, 182 Ill. 241, 55 N.E. 358 (1899); White v. Wagar, 185 Ill. 195, 57 N.E. 26
(I9oo); Joyce v. Chicago, 216 Il. 466, 75 N.E. 184 (195o); Carroll v. Hottston, 341 Ill.
531, 173 N.E. 657 (193o); Crocker v. Abel, 348 111. 269, 18o N.E. 852 (1932); Ellfeldt v.
Chicago, 189 II. App. 61o (1914); People ex rel. Aeberly v. Chicago, 240 InI. App. 208
(1926).

Even conceding that the court felt the need for a more efficacious writ, the order of
the Medical Committee might well have been affirmed. The record contained specific
findings of facts made by a group of medical practitioners. If these facts were sufficient
to justify the finding of gross malpractice by applying the lowest conceivable standard
to the medical profession, then the conclusion should have been upheld and the application of the erroneous standard considered as harmless error. Though an improper
finding of law may be made, if the findings of fact are in accordance with the proper
construction of the law, then the specific finding of law which is erroneous is mere surplusage.
WALTER W. BAKER

Conflict of Laws-Extraterritorial Effect of Custody Decree-[Mvfinnesota].-The
plaintiff and defendant were divorced in Iowa, the court awarding custody of an infant
child alternately to each parent for six months of the year, and providing, for a readjudication of the question of custody in three years. The plaintiff later became domiciled in Minnesota. At the end of one of the six-month periods, plaintiff surrendered
custody of the child to the defendant; but before defendant could return to Iowa, the
plaintiff sued out a writ of habeas corpus challenging his right to the child's custody.
The lower court awarded custody of the child to the plaintiff until further order, and
the defendant appealed, principally on the ground that the Minnesota court lacked
jurisdiction to make a decree affecting the child's custody. Held, the child was domiciled in Minnesota and the MIinnesota court had jurisdiction to determine the child's
custody, not being bound by the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution
to give effect to the Iowa decree. State ex rel. Larson v. Larson, 252 N.W. 329 (Minn.
1934).

Since a decree of custody of a child is an adjudication of a domestic status and alters
substantially the relationship of parent and child, only the state of the child's domicile
should have jurisdiction to award such a decree. People ex rel. Wagner v. Torrence. 27
P. (2d) 1038 (Colo. 1933); Brandon v. Brandon, 154 Ga. 661, i15 S.E. i15 (1922);
W~eber v. Redding, 200 Ind. 448, x63 N.E. 269 (1928); It re Volk, 254 lich. 25, 235
N.W. 854 (i93i); Sanders v. Sanders, 224 Mo. App. 1107, 14 S.W. (2d) 458 (193i); It
re Erving, xo 9 N.J. Eq. 294, 157 AUt. 16x (193'); Griffin v. Griffit, 95 Ore. 78, 187 Pac.
598 (1920); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1st ed. 1927), § 13i; Beale, The Status of The
Child and the Conflict of Laws, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 13, 21 (1933); Beale, The Progress

of the Law, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 5o, 57 (1920); Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce
Suits, 7 Corn. L. Quar. i (1921). Cf. Minick v. Minick, i49 So. 483 (Fla. 1933).
If a court decreeing custody of a child to one parent has adequate jurisdiction, the
preponderance of authority holds that the decree is resjudicataas to all matters prior
to the time of its rendition, and the right of the parent to custody of the child will be
recognized in another state. Wakefield v. Ives, 35 Ia. 238 (1872); State ex rel. Nipp v.
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128 Pac. 590 (1912); Chapman v. Walker, 144 Okla. 83, 289
Pac. 740 (I93o ); it Re Penner, 161 Vash. 479, 297 Pac. 757 (I931r); Groves v. Barto, 1o9
Wash. 112, 186 Pac. 300 (1919). But it is generally held that such a decree has no controlling effect in another state as to facts arising subsequent to the date of the decree.
People ex rel. Stockhant v. Schaedel, 340 Ill. 56o, 173 N.E. 172 (1930); In re Lell, 240
Mich. 240, 215 N.W. 384 (1927); Myliufs v. Cargill, xg N.M. 278, 142 Pac. 918 (1914);
Gaunt v. Gaunt, 16o Okla. 195, 16 P. (2d) 579 (1932); 2o A.L.R. 815 (1922); Beale, The
Status of The Child and the Conflict of Laws, x Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 13, 24 (1933); 26
Mich. L. Rev. 570 (1928). The ease with which a court may find "changed circumstances" has tended to reduce the importance of a foreign custody decree, although the
burden is put upon the person seeking to disturb the status quo to show that new circumstances have arisen. Morrill v. Morrill, 83 Conn. 479, 77 Atl. r (191o); Turner v.
Turner, 169 Atl. 873 (N.H. 1934); Mylius v. Cargill, 19 N.M. 278, 142 Pac. 918 (I914).
A few courts, however, refuse to give any recognition to foreign custody decrees, on
the ground that it is to the best interests of the child to have the entire matter re-litigated by the court of the forum. In re Bort, 25 Kan. 308 (188i); Avery v. Avery, 33
Kan. , 5 Pac. 418 (1885); In re Alderman, 157 N.C. 507, 73 S.E. 126 (i9i1); Friendly
v. Friendly, 137 Ore. 18o, 2 P. (2d) 1 (1931); 2o A.L.R. 817. These cases are distinctly
in the minority. Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 Corn. L. Quar. i
(1921); 27 Mich. L. Rev. 339 (1929); 13 Minn. L. Rev. 261 (1929).
A more difficult problem arises when custody of a childis awarded to one parent, subject to further order of court; and, subsequently, after parent and child have become
domiciled in another state, the decree is modified. Most courts hold that when the
person to whom the custody was given becomes domiciled in another state, the jurisdiction of the first State is ended, and the second state alone may affect the child's
custody, since the child's domicile changes with that of the parent in whose custody he
has been placed. People ex rd. Wagner v. Torrenee, 27 P. (2d) io38 (Colo. 1933); In re
Alderman, 157 N.C. 507, 73 S.E. 126 (igxi); Gaunt v. Gaunt, i6o Okla. 195, 16 P. (2d)
579 (1932); Grifl v. Griffin, 95 Ore. 78, 187 Pac. 598 (1920); Barnes v..Lee, 128 Ore. 655,
275 Pac. 661 (1929); Groves v. Barto, 1o9 Wash. 112, 186 Pac. 300 (1919); Beale, The
Status of The Child and the Conflict of Laws, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 13, 22 (1933). The
present case aligns itself with this group.
On the other hand, a number of courts take the view that the first court retains jurisdiction of questions as to the custody of the child, in spite of the removal of the child
and the custodian parent from the state. Wakefield v. Ives, 35 Ia. 238 (1872); In re
Krautkoff, igi Mo. App. 149, 177 S.W. 1112 (1915); State ex rel. Nipp v. Dist. Ct., 46
Mont. 425, 128 Pac. 590 (1912); Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7
Corn. L. Quar. 1 (1921). See Stetson v. Stetson, So Me. 483, 15 Atl. 6o (1888). If the
child and both parents leave the state in which the custody decree was granted, it seems
possible that all courts might agree that the jurisdiction of the first state has terminated.
There is much to be said for the minority view that the first state retains control of
questions of custody. The welfare of the child should be the paramount consideration
in the award of custody, and the determination of the child's domicile, which is only a
means to that further end, should be governed thereby. In the majority of cases it
would seem that the state in which the divorce is secured is best fitted to provide for the
child's future welfare. In the present case the Iowa court had granted perhaps the

Dist. Ct., 46 Mont. 425,

RECENT CASES
most equitable of custody decrees; care of the child was awarded to each parent, alternately, for equal periods of time, and provision was made for modification in the
future. Yet the majority view, and the present case, permit a custodian to evade that
type of decree by removing the child to another jurisdiction.
Since cases like the present one do represent the modem view, however, perhaps the
only solution is to have the court awarding custody place strong economic pressure
upon the custodian of the child to secure obedience to modifications of the original decree. It will do little good for the first court to threaten the custodian with punishment
for contempt if the child is removed from the court's jurisdiction, since full faith and
credit will not be given to modifications of the custody decree while parent and child
are outside the state. People ex re. Wagner v. Torrence, 27 P. (2d) 1038 (Colo. 1933).
But the first state might require a bond conditioned upon full obedience to future orders
of the court as a condition precedent to securing custody of the child. Mattox v. Mattox,
129 Okla. 301, 264 Pac. 898 (1928).
NATHAN WOLF3ERG

Corporate Reorganization-Premature Receivership-"Upset Price" Doctrine
-[Federal].-The current financial position of the National Radiator Corporation,
judged by the ratio of liquid assets to current liabilities, was excellent; however, the
corporation had sustained heavy operating losses in each year since its organization
in 1927, and the officers and directors believed that some readjustment of the capital
structure, consisting in the main of a large issue of debentures, was necessary to
escape ultimate insolvency. A plan of reorganization involving an exchange of securities was proposed, and eventually accepted by ninety-five per cent of the debenture
holders. Pursuant to the plan, interest payments on the debentures were defaulted.
Thereupon certain dissenting debenture holders sued to collect the interest past due;
to frustrate their action and effectuate the reorganization, a suit in the nature of a
creditor's bill was brought by the bondholders' committee, the prior suit enjoined, and
a receiver appointed. The court set an upset price about ten per cent in excess of the
liquid assets of the corporation, relying entirely on figures compiled by the bondholders' committee, a nominee of which became the purchaser at the receiver's sale
at a sum slightly above the upset price. At the hearing on confirmation of the sale, two
groups of creditors objected, the first on the theory that the court lacked equity jurisdiction of the suit, and the second on the ground that the sale price was inadequate.
Held, the first group was entitled to payment of its claims in full because the receivership and sale was fraudulent in law, since it had hindered and delayed the collection
of these claims while the corporation was solvent; and the second group was entitled
to that sum in cash which they would have received if the property had been sold at
a proper price. First NationalBank v. Flershem, 290 U.S. 504, 54 Sup. Ct. 298 (1934),
rehearing denied Feb. 5,1934.
Since the sanction given the friendly receivership in Re Metropolitan Railway
Receivership, 2o8 U.S. 90, 28 Sup. Ct. 219, 52 L. Ed. 403 (igo8), the Supreme Court
has shown a gradual though decided reversal of feeling toward this device to accomplish corporate readjustment. See Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36, 48 Sup. Ct. 268,
Margolies,279 U.S.
72 L. Ed. 457 (1928), noted in 41 Harv. L. Rev. 804 (1928); Riehle v.
218, 49 Sup. Ct. 310, 73 L. Ed. 669 (1929), Shapiro v. Wilgus, 287 U.S. 348, 53 Sup.
Ct. 142, 77 L. Ed. 355 (1932), noted in 81 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 642 (i933); cf. May Ho-
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siery Mills v. F. W. Grand, 59 F. (2d) 218 (D.C. Mont. 1932), noted in 27 Ill. L. Rev.
542 (1933); Brandeis, Other People's Money (1914). Adverse criticism has centered
around incompetent receivers, exorbitant fees, and abuse of federal diversity jurisdiction. See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Powers Between United States and
State Courts, 13 Corn.L. Quar. 499, 529 (1928); Lowenthal, The Investor Pays (1933).
The principal case is the first square holding expressing this attitude of hostility.
The court indicates that if the corporation had been insolvent (in the equity, not the
bankruptcy sense, apparently), the receivership would have been proper. Cf. Luhrig
Collieries Co. v. Interstate Coal & Dock Co., 281 Fed. 265 (D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1922);
Kingsport Press v. Brief English Syslems, 54 F. (2d) 497 (C.C.A. 2d 1931); Christian
v. 1. Hoe &"Co., 63 F. (2d) 221 (C.C.A. 2d 1933). However sound such a dividing line
may be in view of the logic of previous decisions, from a business viewpoint it seems
lacking in merit. If default is inevitable, it Would seem far better economically to
effect a reorganization before the financial resources of the corporation have been exhausted. See Dewing, Financial Policy of Corporations (1926), bk. V, c. 5, ioi6, c. 8.
If receivership and reorganization is staved off until insolvency, continued operation
of the corporation becomes far more difficult, and a purchaser for receiver's certificates
must frequently be found. Moreover, great uncertainty will always exist as to when a
corporation has reached the necessary hopeless stage that the court will label insolvency, and readjustments will be postponed even longer to avoid the heavy penalty of
payment in full to dissenters meted out by the present case. As a result, it seems unfortunate that a broader rule of receivership jurisdiction, based perhaps on inevitable
default, could not have been adopted. See Billig, Corporate Reorganization: Equity
vs. Bankruptcy, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 237 (1933).
So long as the rule of the present case stands, however, industrial reorganization
under the equity power of the federal courts will be somewhat hazardous, and it seems
probable that some new method of reorganization will be developed, presumably by
legislation. A possible model is Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 47 Stat. 1474, 11
U.S.C.A. Supp. § 205 (1933j, providing for railroad reorganizations. Cf. Canada
Southern, Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 3 Sup. Ct. 363, 27 L. Ed. 1020 (1883); see
Swaine, Corporate Reorganization under the Federal Bankruptcy Power, 19 Va. L.
Rev. 317 (1933); Swaine, Federal Legislation for Corporate Reorganization: An Affirmative View, 39 Am. Bar Assn. Jour. 698 (I933); but see Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization, 1g Va. L. Rev. 541, 698 (933);
Morford, Federal Legislation for Corporate Reorganization: A Negative View, 19 Am.
Bar Assn. Jour. 702 (1933). It is somewhat doubtful, however, whether such a statute
would eliminate many of the present evils of receivership. See Weiner, Reorganization
under Section 77: A Comment, 33 Col. L. Rev. 834 (1933); Lowenthal, The Railroad
Reorganization Act, 47 Harv. L. Rev. x8 (1933); cf. Douglas, Protective Committees
in Railroad Reorganizations, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 565 (1934).
The holding as to the second group of creditors is understandable, since the lower
court had fixed the upset price below the scrap or nominal value of the property. The
language used by the court, however, and the directions given for the calculation of
the sum to be paid these creditors, increase still further the hazards of reorganization
by the usual judicial sale, even though the corporation is able to meet the test of insolvency. Previous decisions had shown considerable uncertainty as to the exact function
of the upset price, and the factors which should enter into its determination. See Blair
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v. St. Louis Ry., 25 Fed. 232 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1885) (upset price fixed at nominal figure);
EquitableTrust Co. v. lVestern Pacific Ry., 233 Fed. 335 (D.C.N.D. Cal. 1916) (earnings
capitalized); Fearonv. Bankers' Trust Co., 238 Fed. 83 (C.C.A. 3 d 1916) (price reduced
in order to secure a bidder); Palmerv. Bankers' Trust Co., 12 F. (2d) 747 (C.C.A. 8th
1926) (weight given to market value of securities prior to reorganization); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. C.M. & St. P. Ry., 15 F. (2d) 434 (D.C.N.D Ill.
1926) (valuation for ratemaking purposes rejected as basis for upset price); American Steamship Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 42 F. (2d) 886 (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 193o ) (court refused to set any
upset price on the theory the matter was within its discretion); Spring, Upset Prices in
Corporate Reorganization, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1919); Swaine, Reorganization of
Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade, 27 Col. L. Rev. goi, 9 3-24
(1927); note, 26 Ill.
L. Rev. 325 (i93i).
The present case gives no exact basis for fixing an upset price, beyond saying that
the second class of objecting creditors is entitled to the sum they would have received
on a sale of the property at a "proper price," and that a price below scrap value, such
as had been fixed by the lower court, was wholly inadequate. Several possible definitions of "proper price" remain, however; see Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Upset Price in a Corporate Reorganization, 27 Col. L. Rev. 132, 139-140 (1927). Perhaps
any of the previous bases for determining upset price which gave dissenters a reasonable amount, though somewhat lower than the actual value of the property, may still
be used. Or, in view of the importance which the court attaches to the fact that an
industrial, not a public utility, reorganization was involved, and the property could
be divided into smaller units, increasing the chances of finding an outside bidder, it
might be expected that the property could be sold at a figure approximating its true
value; hence, perhaps, the upset price should be set as near the true value of the
property as possible, to prevent a sacrifice at a forced judicial sale. See 54 Sup. Ct. 298,
306-307; note, 82 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 539 (i934). But it may also be argued that outside buyers rarely appear, and that the majority committee is, as the court notes, a
"Nilling purchaser ' and almost invariably the successful bidder at the sale. The committee, however, can rarely, if ever, afford to bid the full value of the property;
therefore, a court might only require that the committee bid the highest figure that
will still permit the successful consummation and financing of the reorganization and
the payment of dissenters in cash.
If the present case is construed to establish either of the last two rules for the
fixing of an upset price, it would seem that the present method of reorganization by
judicial sale to the majority will be no longer feasible in most cases. If a creditor can
secure approximately the same amount in cash or securities of somewhat dubious
marketability, he will normally choose the former; thereby the number of dissenters
will be increased, and the problem of raising sufficient cash to pay off dissenters and
finance the reorganization may often prove insurmountable.
Because of the restrictions the principal case places on the usual method of effecting
corporate readjustments, it seems probable that the next step will be to force dissenters
to accept a fair plan of reorganization and to give up their option of taking cash. Apparently a creditor has no inherent right to a judicial sale; he may be compelled to
give up his claim, and accept cash equal to the fair value of the claim as appraised by
the court. Coridlv.M. White, 54 F. (2d) 255 (C.C.A. 2d i931), rev'd on other grounds,
National Surety Co. v. Coriell, 289 U S. 426, 53 Sup. Ct. 678, 77 L. Ed. 1300 (1933);
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notes, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 697 (1932), 41 Yale L. Jour. 577 (1932). If a creditor may be
compelled by a court to give up his right to a judicial sale in return for a cash appraisal
value, it can be argued further that a court of equity has the inherent power to compel
a creditor to accept securities under a fair reorganization plan in return for his claim.
Cf. Phipps v. C., R.I. &"Pac. Ry. Co., 284 Fed. 945 (C.C. A. 8th 1922); see Northern
Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 508, 33 Sup. Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed. 931 (1913); Colin,
Why Upset Price? An Argument for Reorganization by Decree, 28 Ill. L. Rev. 225
(1933); Rosenberg, Reorganization-The Next Step, 22 Col. L. Rev. 14 (1922); but cf.
Swaine, Reorganization-The Next Step: A Reply to Mr. James N. Rosenberg, 22
Col. L. Rev. 121 (1922). In case of a bond issue secured by a mortgage to a trustee,
such i result may be justified as an exercise of the jurisdiction of the court of equity
over trusts. See Straus v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 273 Ill. App. 63 (I933), noted in
i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 623 (1934). If equity lacks inherent power to force dissenters to
accept a plan, a statute may perhaps supply that deficiency. See Detroit Trust Co. v.
Stormfeltz-Loveley Co., 257 Mich. 655, 242 N.W. 227 (x932); cf. CanadaSouthern Ry. v.
Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 3 Sup. Ct. 363, 27 L. Ed. 1020 (1883). A dissenter should only
be forced to accept an equitable plan, however, and such judicial or statutory action as
has been suggested would focus attention clearly on the difficult problem of determining when a plan is fair to all classes of creditors and shareholders of a corporation.
See Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed. 931
(1913); Kansas City Ry. Co. v. Central Union Co., 271 U.S. 445, 46 Sup. Ct. 549, 70
L. Ed. 1028 (1926); Jameson v. GarantyTrust Co., 20 F. (2d) 8o8 (C.C.A. 7th 1927);
Payne, Fair and Equitable Plans of Corporate Reorganization, 20 Va. L. Rev. 37
(1933); Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of the Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 Col. L. Rev. 127 (1928); Buscheck,
A Formula for the Judicial Reorganization of Public Service Corporations, 32 Col. L.
Rev. 964 (1932); Rohrlich, Creditor Control of Corporations; Operating Receiverships;
Corporate Reorganizations, 19 Corn. L. Quar. 35, 53 if. (i933).
NED VEATCH

Criminal Law-Repeal of Constitutional Provision-Effect on Pending Prosecutions-[Federal].-Defendant, indicted in June, 1933 for violation of the National
Prohibition Act, was not brought to trial until after the ratification of the TwentyFirst Amendment, and pleaded that amendment as a bar to conviction. Held, that all
proceedings pending under the prohibition laws at the date of the passage of the Twenty-First Amendment, and of the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment thereby, were
terminated automatically, and defendant must be discharged. United States v. Chainbers, 54 Sup. Ct. 434 (1934).
Defendant had been convicted before the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, and
the conviction had been affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals; petition for certiorari
was filed in the Supreme Court after the repeal. Held, the judgment below must be
reversed and defendant discharged. Massey v. United States, 54 Sup. Ct. 532 (i934).
The repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment raises for the first time the question of
the status of prosecutions begun under a federal statute but incomplete when the constitutional provision authorizing the statute was repealed. No other federal constitutional provision has been repealed, and no similar situation appears to have given rise
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to litigation under state constitutions. The repeal of a statute, however, is generally
construed to act as a pardon to persons whose prosecution under the statute was incomplete at the time of repeal, unless there was a clause in the repealing act, or a general statute, continuing the power to punish past offenses. Yeaton v. United States, 5
Cranch (U.S.) 281, 3 L. Ed. 1o (i8o9); United States v. Tynen, xi Wall. (U.S.) 88, 2o
L. Ed. x53 (1870); Keller v. State, 12 Md. 322 (1858); cf. Hobson v. People, 48 Mich. 27,
ii N.W. 771 (1882).

Since repeal of a constitutional provision is said to terminate leg-

islation authorized solely by that provision, the court in the present cases reasoned
from the analogy of a repealed statute to a nullified act and applied the general rule;
thus prosecutions begun under the now nullified legislation, but not completed at the
time of nullification, should be dismissed. See Burdick, Law of the American Constitution (1923), 406. The Twenty-First Amendment contained no saving clause, and the
act of Congress [16 Stat. 432 (87), 1 U.S.C.A. § 29 (1926)] which continues the power

to punish offenses committed against subsequently repealed statutes is not applicable
to a constitutional amendment. See Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927),
ii;

note, 32 Mich. L. Rev. 700 (1934)-

As applied to statutes, the rule of construction which terminates prosecutions seems
open to some criticism. It derives support in criminal cases from the ancient policy of
favoring the accused by construing statutes strictly against the state. Bank of St.
Mary's v. State, 12 Ga. 475 (1853); Hartungv. People, 22 N.Y. 95 (r86o). And the same
result is reached as in the case of a statute expressly withdrawing court jurisdiction.
Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 506, ig L. Ed. 264 (x868). But the widespread enactment of general "saving clause" statutes, applicable to all subsequent repealing acts
unless otherwise specified, is some evidence that in most instances of repealing legislation it was contemplated that pending prosecutions would continue. See 16 Stat. 432
(1871), i U.S.C.A. § 29 (1926); Cal. Pol. Code (1931), § 329; Ill. CahiU's Rev. Stat.
(1933), c. 131, § 4; Iowa Code (1931), § 63 (1); Mich. Pub. Acts (x93), no. 25, § 4a;
N.Y. Cahill's Consol. Laws. (1930), c. 23, § 93; Ohio Throckmorton's Code (I929), §
26; Wis. Stat. (193), c. 370, § 4; see Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 30 Sup. Ct. 621,
54 L. Ed. 1oo1 (191o). And the application of the doctrine when the new legislation

reflects no fundamental change of policy seems questionable. Cf. Sturgisv. Spofford, 45
N.Y. 446 (187). Moreover, the operation of the rule in specific cases is apt to be fortuitous, dependent upon the speed with which particular courts, trial and appellate,
dispose of the case, and may be the result of abuse of legal processes. The application
of the rule is more defensible in the case of nullification of a statute by constitutional
amendment, which would seem to reflect a fundamental change of policy. The care
used in framing such amendments would afford almost conclusive evidence that the
omission of a saving clause was intended to permit immediate cessation of all proceedings. The lower federal courts considering the problem before the decision in the
Chambers case unanimously reached the same result. Green v. United States, 67 F. (2d)
846 (C.C.A.

9 th 1933);

Smallwood v. United States, 68 F. (2d) 244 (C.C.A.

5

th 1933);

United States v. Gibson, 5 F. Supp. 153 (D.C.M.D.N.C. 193&); United States v. Borke,
5 F. Supp. 429 (D.C.E.D. Mich. 1933); United States v. Smith, 5 F. Supp. 470 (D.C.

W.D. Okla. 1933). See McLucas, Some Legal Aspects of the Repeal of the Eighteenth
Amendment, 28 Ill. L. Rev. 950 (1934).
FRED M. MERRIFIELD
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Criminal Law-Use of Evidence of Prior Offenses in Fixing Discretionary Penalties-[llinois].-Defendant was found guilty by a judge sitting without a jury. As
provided by an Illinois statute, the judge in fixing the sentence examined "witnesses
as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offense," and heard oral testimony as to
the defendant's conviction of a similar crime fourteen years before. [Ill. Smith-Hurd
Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 38, § 732.] On appeal the judgment was reversed on other
grounds; but in a separate opinion by three of the seven justices it was stated that a
judge, in examining witnesses as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offense, was
restricted by the "rules of evidence of any other inquiry." People v. Serrielle, 354 Ill.
182, 388 N.E. 375 (I933).
It is a general rule that evidence of previous offenses by the defendant is inadmissible at a trial, since it becomes a basis for an argument from defendant's general character to the specific crime of which he is now accused, and is of relatively low probative
value. I Wigmore, Evidence (19o4), §§ 215-216. An exception exists where the previous offenses are related to the subject matter of the present trial in such a way as to
show a unified plan or scheme; i.e., where the evidence is valuable for other than the
character argument. I Wigmore, Evidence (r9o4), § 392. Once a verdict of guilty is
reached, however, the objection to the introduction of such evidence would seem to
disappear, since it is no longer being used in establishing defendant's conduct on a
specific occasion.
The great majority of jurisdictions permit the judge to consider evidence of prior
offenses in fixing a discretionary punishment. Peterson v. U.S., 246 Fed. 118 (C.C.A.
4 th 19I7), certiorari denied 246 U.S. 661, 38 Sup. Ct. 332, 62 L.Ed. 927 (i9x8);
Sharp v. U.S., 55 F. (2d) 227 (C.C.A. 4 th 1932); State v. Walter, 178 Iowa iio8, 16o
N.W. 821 (1917); People v. Williams, 225 Mich. 133, 195 N.W. 1i (1923); Booth v.
State, 122 Neb. 544, 24o N.W. 753 (1932); Fink v. State, 40 Ohio App. 431, 178 N.E.
700 (193i); State v. Wise, 32 Ore. 280, 5o Pac. 8oo (1897). In Peoplev. Mansi, 129 App.
Div. 386, 133 N.Y.S. 866 (i9o8) unsworn testimony that the prisoner's portrait was

in the rogue's gallery was admitted on the ground that the ordinary rules of evidence do
not apply in such inquiries after a verdict.
The present case and three other very recent decisions indicate that the Illinois law
as to the use of such evidence is quite unsettled. The majority view, permitting the
consideration of previous crimes, was adopted in People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 177
N.E. 739 (1931). In April, 1932 the Illinois court again followed the majority view:

Peoplev. McWilliams, 348 Ill. 333, i8o N.E. 832. Two months later, ignoring both the
McWilliams and Popescue cases, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the contrary rule
that evidence of previous offenses was not admissible in fixing the sentence. State v.
Corry, 349 Ill. 122, i8i N.E. 6o3 (June 1932). The courtmayhave been in part swayed
by the fact that the defendant was but fifteen years of age. The dictum of the principal
case follows the Corry case, without citing it.
Statistics support the general supposition that a habitual criminal is more likely to
commit crimes in the future than the person who is a first offender, the likelihood of
future offenses increasing with the number of past crimes. Glueck and Glueck, Five
Hundred Criminal Cases (1933), 250-251; Bruce, Harno, Burgess, Landesco, Parole

and Indeterminate Sentence (1928), 224-225. In fixing the extent of the punishment
the court might well make a distinction between those who are, and those who are
not, likely to repeat the offense upon release. To do this the judge must have evidence
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of past offenses. Though the crime in the present case, committed fourteen years before, should perhaps be given little weight, to deny the judge the privilege of considering it altogether would be unnecessarily depriving him of valuable information in
exercising his discretion in the fixing of the penalty.
FLORENCE BROADY
Equity-Suit upon Foreign Decree for Alimony-Enforcement by Contempt Proceedings-[Minnesota].-The plaintiff, having been awarded alimony in a divorce action in South Dakota, sought to recover the accrued alimony in an equitable suit in
Minnesota, and asked, that the decree make provision for enforcement by contempt.
The trial court, having found that the plaintiff's legal remedy was inadequate because
the defendant persisted in making salary assignments to his wife, rendered a decree for
payment of the accrued alimony, and provided for enforcement of the decree by contempt proceedings. Held, decree affirmed. Ostranderv. Ostrander,252 N.11. 449 (Minn.
1934).
If the amount of accrued alimony may not be affected by the court awarding the
decree, action upon it is usually permitted in a foreign court. Mayer v. Mayer, 154
Mich. 386, 117 N.W. 89o (i9o8); Williamson v. Williamson, 169 App. Div. 597, 155
N.Y.S. 423 (i9,5). Where the legal remedy is inadequate, and there is no affirmative
objection, such action should be permitted in a court of equity. Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence (4 th ed. i918), § 22o. The court in the principal case, having concluded
that the plaintiff's legal remedies were inadequate [see McClintock, Adequacy of Ineffective Remedy at Law, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 233 (1932)], provided for enforcement of
the decree by contempt proceedings on the ground that the case came within the
terms of a statute permitting the use of such proceedings "in all cases where alimony
or other allowance is ordered or decreed to the wife or child." Mason's Minn. Stat.
(1927), § 8604. Under a similar statute a Michigan court came to the opposite and
perhaps justifiable conclusion that the statute did not refer to decrees of foreign courts.
Mayer v. Mayer, 154 Mich. 386, ii7 N.W. 89o (ioo8).
It is believed, however, that the same result as in the principal case could have been
reached independently of the statute. One of the inherent powers of a court of equity
is to enforce its decrees by the process of contempt. 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence
(4 th ed. i9r8), § 1433. A state, however, may place certain limitation upon this power.
It has been held that statutes making available common law execution for the enforcement of equity decrees restrict the equity court's attaching power to those cases where
the remedy by execution has been exhausted, or where it would be futile to pursue it.
Klinek v. Borkowski, 259 Mich. 383, 243 N.V. 313 (1932), note, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 731
(1933); Harris v. Elliott, 163 N.Y. 269, 57 N.E. 406 (I9oo). The majority of jurisdic-

tions, however, hold that such a statute merely creates an additional method of enforcing an equitable decree. llriglztman v. TVigltman, 45 Ill. 167 (1867); White v. White,
233 Mass. 39, 123 N.E. 389 (1919). The Minnesota divorce statute provided for sequestration, but such process would have been futile in the principal case. Cf. People
v. Wagner, 117 Misc. 526, i91 N.Y.S. 697 (1921).
It is generally held that the usual constitutional guarantee against imprisonment for
debt restricts the power of a court of equity to enforce its money decrees. Caughlin v.
Ehbert, 39 Mo. 285 (i866); People v. Pape, 230 App. Div. 649, 246 N.Y.S. 414 (1930);
BrierhurstReally Co. v. Lambrecht, 299 Pa. 9, 149 Atl. 863 (1930). A minority of courts,
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however, reason that such a constitutional provision prevents attachment where the
defendant is unable to comply with the terms of the decree, but not where he is able to
comply but refuses, as in the present case. It is said in the latter case the imprisonment
is not for the debt but for the contempt in refusing to pay. Hurd v. Hurd, 63 Minn.
443, 6 5 N.W. 728 (1896). Such an analysis leads to the conclusion that the equity
courts' power is not in reality restricted, for inability to comply with a decree traditionally purged a defendant of contempt. Blake v. People, 8o Ill. 1T (1875); Davison v.
Davison, 125 Kan. 807, 266 Pac. 650 (1928); Lakewood Trust Co. v. Lawshane Co., 102
N.J.Eq. 270, 14o Atl. 334 (1928); but see Cook, Powers of a Court of Equity, 15 Col.
L. Rev. lo6, 112, n. 18 (1915).
Even if it is assumed that the imprisonment for debt provision restricts the power of
a court of equity to enforce money decrees, it is generally held that the obligation to pay
alimony is not a debt within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Wiglitinan v.
Wightman, 45 Ill. 167 (1867); White v. White, 233 Mass. 39, 123 N.E. 389 (1919);
contra, Coughlin v. Ehbert, 29 Mo. 285 (1866). And the nature of the obligation should
not be altered when the original alimony decree is merged in the decree in the present
suit. White v. White, 233 Mass. 39, 123 N.E. 389 (1919).
HOWARD SIEGEL

Insurance-Sunstroke as Death by Accidental Means-[Federal].-The petitioner
as beneficiary sought recovery upon two insurance policies providing for payment upon
death from "external, violent and accidental means"; one policy excluded liability if
death resulted "wholly or partly from disease or physical or mental infirmity." The
declaration alleged that insured suffered a sunstroke while playing golf and that there
was, unknown to him, a "temporary disorder or condition of his body not amounting
to a physical or mental infirmity." Held, that the order sustaining the demurrer be
affirmed. Landress v. Phoenix Mitt. Life Ins. Co., 54 Sup. Ct. 461 (1934). Cardozo, J.,
dissenting.
Doubtless the insurer in using the term "death by external, violent and accidental
means" rather than "accidental death" intended to limit liability to cases in which
some accidental means caused the death, as distinguished from situations where the
result alone is accidental and the act constituting the ineans is intentional. See Vance,
Insurance (2d ed. 1930), 871, § 258. This distinction between "accidental means" and
"accidental result" has been universally recognized, U.S. Mutual Assn. v. Barry, 131
U.S. 100, 9 Sup. Ct. 755, 33 L. Ed. 6o (r889), but courts have differed in their application of it. In sunstroke cases involving facts similar to the present case, apparently all
th6 federal courts and a number of the state courts refuse recovery because the sun's
rays do not constitute a mishap or accident, and the subjection to them is voluntary.
Nickman v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 39 F. (2d) 763 (C.C.A. 6th 1928); Paistv. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 54 F. (2d) 393 (D.C. Pa. 1931): Harloev. Cal. State Life Ins. Co., 206 Cal. 141, 273
Pac. 56o (1929); Continental Casualty Co. v. Pittman, 145 Ga. 641, 89 S.E. 716 (i916);
Semancik v. Continental Casualty Co., 56 Pa. Super. Ct. 392 (1914). If by accident a
person is subjected to the sun's rays and dies from sunstroke, recovery is allowed; the
accident is treated as the means of the death. Richards v. StandardAccident Ins. Co.,
58 Utah 622, 200 Pac. 1017 (1921), see Sinclairv. Maritime PassengersAssur. Co., 3 El.
& El. 487, 7 Jurist (N.S.) 367 (1861). The other state decisions adopt an interpretation
of "accidental means" broader than that intended by the insurer, and hold that if the
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result is accidental, it has been caused by accidental means. Continental Casualty Co. v.
Bruden, 178 Ark. 683, ii S.W. (2d) 493 (1928); Tate v. Benefit Assn. of Ry. Employees,
186 Minn. 538, 243 N.W. 694 (1932), 17 Minn. L.Rev. 216 (x933); Lower v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., iii N.J.L. 426, 168 Aft. 592 (1933).
If there is a natural and reasonable difference of import between the two terms,
"accidental death" and "accidental means," that difference will be given effect. inperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U.S. 452, 14 Sup. Ct. 379,38 L. Ed. 231 (1894);
Hawkeye Comm. Men's Assn. v. Christy, 294 Fed. 208 (C.C.A. 8th 1923). To the layman
the words "external, violent and accidental means" would seem to suggest that the
means be accidental as well as the result, and thus would support the view of the majority in the present case. See Cooper, Accidental Means Insurance, 25 In. L. Rev.
673 (1931). Mr. Justice Cardozo in urging the opposite interpretation bases his argument on the layman's conception of an accident, rather than the layman's conception
of the wording of the policy after careful perusal; and many of the cases he relies upon
can be distinguished on the exact wording of the policies involved. In some cases the
policy includes sunstroke as a bodily injury and seems to leave open the question of
accidental means; but it may be inferred that the policy does include death by sunstroke since it is difficult to conceive of sunstroke being brought on by other than intended means. Higgins v. M11idland Casualty Co., 281 Ill. 431, 118 N.E. ii (1917);
Eslev v. Fidelity & CasualtyCo., 187 Ind. 447, 12o N.E. 42 (1918), Gallagherv. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 221 N.Y. 664, 117 N.E. iO67 (1914); Continental Casualty Co. v. Clark,
70 Okla. 187, 173 Pac. 453 (1918); Bryant v. Continental Casualty Co., 107 Tex. 582,
182 S.W. 673 (1916). It also might be said that the express mention of sunstroke would
lead a man to believe the policy did cover that cause of death, and, in case of ambiguity, it should be construed in favor of the insured. Harrisv. Am. Casualty Co., 83
N.J.L. 641, 85 At. 194 (1912); Weiss v. Union m demnity Co., 107 N.J.L. 348, 153 Adt.
508 (1931). In other cases, express provisions provide for liability if death is caused by
sunstroke. Pack v. PrudentialCasualty Co., 140 Ky. 47, 185 S.W. 496 (1916); Mather
v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 125 Minn. 186, 145 N.W. 963 (1914).
While sunstroke technically is and has been treated in some cases as a disease,
Dozier v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 46 Fed. 446 (C.C.Mo. 1891); Sinclair v. Assurance
Co., 2 El. & El. 478, 7 Jurist (N.S.) 367 (186i), almost all of the later cases regard it as
an accident. See Lower v. MetropolitanLife Ins. Co., 11i N.J.L. 426, 168 At. 592 (1933).
The clause in one of the policies excluding the insurer from liability if death should result partially from a disease seems of no importance whether sunstroke is treated as a
disease or as an accidental injury, since diseases attributable solely to an external force
and not existing in the insured at the time of the accident are not regarded as causes of
the death, but as effects of the accident. The disease is considered only a link in the
chain of causation and the accident is looked upon as the actual cause of the death.
Western Comm. Tray. Assn. v. Smith, 85 Fed. 4O (C.C.A. 8th 1898); Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Allen, 32 F. (2d) 490 (C.C.A. 1st 1929); Paistv. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 54 F. (2d)
393 (D.C.Pa. 1931).
RcIIARD LiNDLMnA

Mortgages-Claim of Junior Mortgagee to Prior Lien for Payment of Taxes on.
Premises-[New York].-In an action for the foreclosure of a prior mortgage, junior
mortgagees interposed a defense and counterclaim for taxes and water rents which they
had paid, claiming equitable subrogation to the rights and remedies of the taxing body,

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
and seeking a prior lien on the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. Held, the defense and
counterclaim is insufficient in law. Laventall v. .Pomerantz, 263 N.Y. iio, i88 N.E. 271
(1933).
Although a mortgagee is generally allowed reimbursement when he has paid taxes
upon which the mortgagor was in default, 84 A.L.R. 1366; 3 Cooley, Taxation (4 th ed.
1924), § 3263, there is a division of authority as to whether a prior lien should be allowed for the amount paid. See 61 A.L.R. 6oi; 84 A.L.R. 1393. In some jurisdictions
the taxpayer will be given a lien only equal in rank to that of his incumbrance. Allison
v. Corson, 83 Fed. 752 (C.C.S.D. 1897); Sperry v. Butler, 75 Conn. 369, 53 Ad. 899
(19o3); Pearmainv. Mass. HospitalLife Ins. Co., 206 Mass. 377, 92 N.E. 497 (x9o);
Chrisinanv. Hough, 146 Mo. 102, 47 S.W. 941 (1898); Lawyers' Title and Guaranty Co.
v. Claren, 237 App. Div. 188, 26o N.Y.S. 847 (1932); see 46 Harv. L. Rev. io36 (933).

Other jurisdictions recognize the right of the taxpayer to be equitably subrogated to the
lien of the taxing power for the amount paid, thus allowing a lien paramount to all senior incumbrances. Ringo v. Woodruff, 43 Ark. 469, 498 (i884); Atchison Savings Bank
v. Wyman, 65 Kan. 314, 69 Pac. 326 (1902); Fifth Ward Bldg. Assn. v. Dine's Trustee,
6o S.W. 9 (Ky. 9oo); Noeker v. Howry, iig Mich. 626, 78 N.W. 669 (1899); Norton
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 74 Minn. 484, 77 N.W. 298, 539 (1898); Fiacre v. ChapMan, 32 N.J.Eq. 463 (i88o); Fischerv. Woodruff, 25 Wash. 67, 64 Pac. 923 (1901).
Against the right of the taxpayer to be equitably subrogated to the lien of the taxing
power, it has been argued that to allow subrogation would necessarily require granting
the taxing body's privileges as to methods of collection. Sperry v. Butler, 75 Conn. 369,
53 Ad. 899 (1903). It would seem entirely possible, however, to allow subrogation to a
lien without also granting the privilege as to collection.
It is also urged that where the duty to pay taxes is upon the mortgagor, the junior
incumbrancer cannot be subrogated to the rights of the taxing power so as to give him
priority over the senior mortgagee, because subrogation cannot be invoked against a
third person who was not liable for the indebtedness discharged. Lawyers' Title and
GuarantyCo. v. Claren, 237 App. Div. 188, 26o N.Y.S. 847 (932). But the claim of the
taxpayer is for subrogation to a lien, not to a right in personam,against the prior incumbrancer. See 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1o36 (933).

The strongest argument against subrogation seems to be that since the right to foreclose on default in the payment of taxes is usually reserved in the mortgage, the junior
mortgagee's payment of taxes has deprived the senior mortgagee of his right to foreclose, and should not in addition give the taxpayer a lien prior to the senior mortgage.
This argument is relied upon in the principal case and in Pearmainv. Mass. Hospital
Life Ins. Co., 206 Mass. 377, 92 N.E. 497 (i9io). Although there is little authority, it
seems doubtful whether the payment of taxes by the second mortgagee would prevent
foreclosure. See 2 Jones, Mortgages ( 7 th ed. 1915), § i175a. And it may be suggested
that ordinarily a mortgagee would prefer the cessation of tax penalties and the removal
of the possibility of legal proceedings by the taxing power to the opportunity to foreclose. Noeker v. Howry, 119 Mich. 626, 78 N.W. 669 (i899); Fiacre v. Chapman, 32
N.J.Eq. 463 (i88o).
Where the doctrine of subrogation to the paramount lien is applied, it is done so only
if it is warranted by the circumstances of the particular case. Thus where the junior
mortgagee who paid the taxes was in possession of the property and collected rents in
excess of the taxes paid, he was refused subrogation to the lien of the taxing body.
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Flower v. Bricker, 178 Ark. 764, 12 S.W. (2d) 394 (1929). And where the prior mortgagee was assured by the junior mortgagee that taxes had been paid, and that no prior
lien was in existence, the latter was estopped to assert a prior lien for the taxes he had
paid. Warranty Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Cimirro Construction Co., iir N.J.Eq. 8, i6o
AUt. 847

(1932),

affd. 113 N.J.Eq. 31, 166 At. 198 (V933).

In a few jurisdictions, the

problem has been recognized by the legislature and the taxpaying junior incumbrancer
given a prior lien by statute. Ky. Stat. (1930), § 4o32;La. Civ. Code (1932), Art. 2161;
see Timken v. Wisner Estates, 153 La. 262, 95 So. 711 (1923).

MisHA RuBm
Partnership-Individual Liability of Beneficiaries of Business Trust-[New York].
-Defendants formed a syndicate agreement to deal in bank stock with sole control
vested in named managers. The agreement restricted the liability of a participant to
the amount contributed. Plaintiff who knew of the agreement brought this action to
recover the balance due on a promissory note or the same balance due for money lent.
The courts below held the agreement created a trust and that the managers would be
solely liable. Held, judgment below reversed. The subscribers are liable as partners,
and the plaintiff is bound by the agreement to restrict liability. Brown v. Bedell, 263
N.Y. 177, 188 N.E. 641 (1934).
The business trust has been used as a device to escape partnership liability and to
secure corporate advantages where there is an inability to incorporate or a desire to
avoid corporate burdens. See Weber Co. v. Alter, 12o Kan. 557, 245 Pac. 143, 46 A.L.R.
158 (1926); Bonbright and Means, The Holding Company (1932), 81, 120, 207-208,
218; Warren, Corporate Advantages without Incorporation (1929), 398; Powell, The
Passing of the Corporation in Business, 2 Minn. L. Rev. 4O (I918); Massachusetts
Trusts, 37 Yale L. Jour. iio3 (1928). The investors, while contributing capital for the
purpose of profit making, seek to be protected from personal liability on the theory that
as cestuis they are not answerable for the debts of the trust. Dantzler v. Mclnnis, 151
Ala. 293, 44 So. 193 (1907); Goldwaterv. Altman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 Pac. 624 (1930); Falardeauv. Boston Art Assn., 182 Mass. 405, 65 N.E. 797 (19o3); see i9 Cal. L. Rev. 42

(193o). Some jurisdictions have permitted such insulation from liability where the investors have retained little or no control over the trustees. Dana v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 227 Mass. 562, 116 N.E. 947 (1917); Greco v. Hubbard,252 Mass. 37, 147
N.E. 272 (1925). Investors retaining no control, without the protection of the trust,

are like dormant partners, who in order to escape partnership liability would probably have to comply with the limited partnership statutes. But see Giles v. Velte,
263 U.S. 553, 44 Sup. Ct. 157, 68 L. Ed. 44i (1924); Crane, Are Limited Partnerships
Necessary?, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 35i (1933). Even the protection of the trust has been in-

sufficient in some jurisdictions to prevent liability to the investors because the legislature by authorizing certain business devices for limiting liability has been said to
have negatived the use of others. Reillyv. Clyne, 27 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35 (1925); Willey
v. Hoggson Corp., 9o Fla. 343, 353, io6 So. 408 (1925); McClaren v. Dawes Elec. Sign
& Mfg. Co., 86 Ind. App. x96, 156 N.E. 584 (1927); Weber Engine Co. v. Barley, 123
Kan. 665, 266 Pac. 8o3 (1927); Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S.W. 554 (1925);
State v. Paine,137 Wash. 566, 243 Pac. 2 (1926); see Magruder, The Position of Shareholders in Business Trusts, 23 Col. L. Rev. 423 (1923); Brown, Contractual Limitation

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
of Liability by the So-Called "Massachusetts Trust," 3 Ind. L. Jour. 318 (1928). And
it has been said that the protection granted the cestuis by courts of equity together
with the profit-making purpose of the association should render the cestuis personally
liable. Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S.W. 554 (1925). The trustee's right to
reimbursement from the trust estate, and, if that is insufficient, then against the beneficiary personally, has been suggested as a means of placing an indirect liability upon
the investors, where the existence of the trust is regarded as a bar to direct obligation.
Hardoon v. Beilios, [19O1] A.C. 118; Stevens, Limited Liability in Business Trusts, 7
Corn. L. Quar. 116 (1922); Hildebrand, Liability of Trustees, Property, and Shareholders of a Massachusetts Trust, 2 Tex. L. Rev. 139, 165 (1924). But even in jhrisdictions where an investor without control is protected by the trust device, an investor
who has the power to "make rules for the conduct of the business and to direct the
trustees in any matter" is held liable on the theory that the association created is a
partnership and the trustees are agents. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 Yale L. Jour. 720, 741 (1929); Betts v. Hackathorn,159 Ark. 621, 626,
252 S.W. 602, 604, 31 A.L.R. 847,850 (1923); Sivison v. Klipstein, 262 Fed. 823 (1920);
Frost v. Thompsot, 219 Mass. 360, io6 N.E. 109 (1914).
The New York Court apparently has recognized that a trust will bar the investor's
liability to creditors where little or no control is retained. Jones v. Gould, 209 N.Y.
419, 1O3 N.E. 720 (1913); Barnesv. Chase Nat. Bank, 225 App. Div. 102, 232 N.Y.S.
224 (1928), affd. 251 N.Y. 551, 168 N.E. 423 (1929). The investors in the present case
seemed to have retained no control, but the court, declaring that it "should not be
solicitous to give corporate advantages without incorporation" and that it had an
"abundance of authority to sustain" its position, found that no trust existed to bar
liability inasmuch as there was no formal conveyance of title to the managers and the
managers were not called trustees. 263 N.Y. 189; see Riley, Business Trusts and Their
Relation to West Virginia Law, 28 West Va. L. Quar. 287, 288 (1922).
Assuming that the trust device has not insulated the investors from liability, a
creditor may be limited by his express agreement from holding either the manager or
the investors. Shelton v. Montoya, 292 S.W. 165 (Tex. Com. App. 1927); Philip Carey
Co. v. Pingree, 223 Mass. 352, 1ii N.E. 857 (1916). Furthermore, as in the present case,
the creditor's knowledge that the investors intended and believed their liability to be
limited has been held to so limit their liability as to that creditor. McCarthy v. Parker,
243 Mass. 465, 138 N.E. 8 (1923); Hotchin v. Kent, 8 Mich. 526 (186o); contra: Victor
Refining Co. v. City Nat. Bank of Cmininerce, 115 Tex. 71, 274 S.W. 561 (1925); see
Wrightington, Voluntary Associations in Massachusetts, 21 Yale L. Jour. 311, 319

This result has been reached either on the basis of estoppel or on the doctrine
that one who knows an agent is unauthorized to act cannot hold the principal for the
unauthorized act. Dunning v. Gibbs, 213 Ky. 81 (1926); Roberts v. Aberdeen Syndicate, 198 N.C. 381, 151 S.E. 865 (193o); cf. Chapmanv. Witt, 285 S.W. 331 (Tex. Civil
App. 1926). It is analogous to the denial to a creditor of the right to hold the shareholder of a defectively organized corporation (not a defacto corporation) personally
liable when he has dealt with them as shareholders with limited liability. Ballantine,
Corporations (1927), §§ 28, 29. But it is perhaps inconsistent with the doctrine that
members of a defective limited partnership are personally liable to a creditor who
knew they represented themselves as limited partners. Andrews v. Schott, io Pa. St. 47
(1848). And with the fact that trustees of a business trust held to be a partnership
(1912).
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will be personally liable to a creditor who knew of the existence of partners but not
their identity. i Mechem Agency (2d ed. 1914), § 1169; Restatement of the Law of
Agency (r933), § 336, comment C.
In the present case, the court held the plaintiff bound by his knowledge of the agreement by the partners to restrict their liability. It is not clear whether the liability of
the managers, who were also investors, was intended by the court to be similarly limited.
In Illinois the position of a shareholder without control in a business trust is uncertain. See Judah, Possible Partnership Liability under the Business Trust, 17 Ill. L.
Rev. 77 (1922). A strong dictum in Schumann-Heink v. Folson, 328 11. 321, 159 N.E.
250, 58 A.L.R. 485 (1928) recognized the shareholders' immunity from personal liability to creditors, but the case actually involved an express contract by the creditor not
to hold the trustees personally liable, and the court gave effect to that contract. On the
other hand, an equally strong dictum in Hunter v. Winter, 268 Ill. App. 487 (1932) indicates that the shareholders will be answerable to creditors, although the decision merely
held trustees personally liable in the absence of an express contract against personal
liability as was present in the Schumann-Heink case. The use of the trust device in
Illinois was no doubt stimulated by the prohibition in the former General Corporation
Act against corporations founded for the purpose of owning and dealing in real estate.
Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1931), c. 32, § 1o. See Aaron, The Massachusetts Trust as Distinguished from Partnership, 12 Ill. L. Rev. 482 (1918). Thepresent Business Corporation Act removes that restriction. Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 32, § 7.
HARoLD AL-RFD LIPON
Taxation-Excise Tax upon Sales of Stock Made Outside the Jurisdiction[Federal].-A Florida statute placed a stamp tax upon "all sales, agreements to sell,
or memoranda of sales or deliveries of, [or] transfers of legal title to shares," whether or
not entered upon the books of the corporation; and upon written obligations to pay
money which were made, executed, or transferred in Florida. [Laws (Ex. Sess. I93I),
c. 15787]. Plaintiffs, doing business as brokers in Florida, sought to enjoin the levying
of the tax, presumably upon transactions wherein the plaintiffs received orders to sell
stock from customers in Florida and executed the sales on the New York exchange.
Held, (i) that the tax was unconstitutional as applied to sales of stock of foreign corporations made outside the state; (2) that as to shares of a Florida corporation and
transfers thereof made on the company books in Florida, the tax was valid, even though
the sales were executed outside the state; and (3) that stockbrokers' loans to clients
on margin accounts were subject to the tax as transactions distinct from the sale or
purchase of the stock. Bickell v. Lee, 5 F. Supp. 720 (D.C.N.D. Fla. 1934).
In addition to Florida, tax statutes of this type have been enacted by the federal
government, 43 Stat. 331 (1024), 26 U.S.C.A. § 9o(3) (1928); Indiana, Acts (1933),
c. 8i; Massachusetts, Gen. Laws (1932), c. 64; New York, Cahill's Cons. Laws (193o),
c. 6i, §§ 270-281; Pennsylvania, 72 Purdon's Stat. (i931), §§ 2041, 2042; South Carolina, Code (1932), § 2525. Since most sales of shares take place in New York the present decision serves to prevent states other than New York from realizing any considerable income from taxing transactions of this character. The severity of the decision
is lessened by the holding that loans upon margin accounts are subject to an excise
tax.
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As to transfers of corporate shares within the taxing jurisdiction, the validity of
excise taxes of this nature is well established. Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363,
24 Sup. Ct. 305, 48 L.Ed. 481 (1904); Opinion of the Jitstices, 196 Mass. 603, 85 N.E.
545 (19o8); People ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 184 N.Y. 431, 77 N.E. 970 (i9o6), affd.
204 U.S. 152, 27 Sup. Ct. i88, 51 L.Ed. 415 (1907). Also, the state in which the stock
transfer books are kept may tax transfers made upon such books. Christy, The Trans.
fer of Stock (1929), 555. It has been said that the state of the company's incorporation
may place an excise tax upon the transfer of the shares of that company. See FirstNat.
Bank of Boston v. State of Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 330, 52 Sup. Ct. 174, 76 L. Ed. 313
(1932). The language of the present case indicates that for the tax to be valid as to
sales outside the taxing jurisdiction, that jurisdiction should be the state where the
transfer books are kept as well as the state of incorporation. See 5 F. Supp. 721. Normally transfer books will be kept in the state of incorporation, however, and that result is required by statutes which have been enacted in a number of states, including
Florida; hence the problem raised is largely academic. 3 Florida Comp. Gen. Laws
(1927), § 6584; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932), c. i55, § 22; N.Y. Cahill's Cons. Laws (i93o),
c. 6o, § 10; 72 Pa. Purdon's Stat. (193I), § 2082; Ind. Burn's Stat. (1933), § 2-3611
(by implication). It is to be noted that a tax upon transfers on the corporate books
would not reach many unrecorded transfers which the statute in the principal case did
attempt to affect.
Though the court in the present case decided that the memorandum passing between the customer and broker in Florida could not be subjected to an excise tax,
a recent Supreme Court case indicates that a different decision possibly could have
been reached on this point. Cf. Graniteville Mfg. Co. v. Query, 283 U.S. 376, 51 Sup.
Ct. 515, 75 L.Ed. 1126 (193i), in which notes drawn in South Carolina and sent outside the state were subject to a stamp tax imposed by South Carolina, though, by the
agreement under which they were sent out, they were to be of no effect until received
and accepted. The loans which were to be effected by the notes were dearly consummated outside the state; similarly, in the principal case the sales which the memoranda effected took place outside the taxing jurisdiction.
BRisoN GRow
Taxation-Income Tax-fD eductions-[Federal.--Bankruptcy proceedings against
a partnership of Donnelley and another were dismissed in 19o5 when Donnelley's
brother in law, Thorne, paid creditors of the partnership a percentage of the full
amount due from the firm, and secured an assignment of their claims. In 1927 Donnelley made a payment to these former creditors to be applied as principal and interest
on the old debts, and deducted that sum from his gross income for 1927 in computing
his income tax. Held, the payments to the former creditors may not be deducted in
determining taxable income. Donnelley v. Commissionerof Internal Revenne, 68 F.(2d)
722 (C.C.A. 7th 1934).
The liability to pay the income tax attaches when the income is received. Rosenwald v. Cor., 12 B.T.A. 350 (1928), affd. 33 F.(2d) 423 (C.C.A. 7th :929). Subsequent
disbursements or losses are, therefore, deductible only if authorized by statute. Spring
Canyon Coal Co. v. Com., 43 F.(2d) 78 (C.C.A. roth :1930), cert. den. 284 U.S. 654, 52
Sup. Ct. 33, 76 L. Ed. 555 (i31); Jankowsky v. Coin., 56 F.(2d) loo6 (C.C.A. ioth
1932); Mitchel v. Bowers, iS F.(2d) 287 (C.C.A. 2d 1926).
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Deductions allowed by the federal income statutes relevant to the principal case
are: (i) necessary and ordinary expenses, not of a permanent nature, incurred or paid
in carrying on a trade or business, Rev. Act (1926), §214 (a) (r), 44 Stat. 26, 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 935 (1928), Art. 121, Reg. 74; (2) losses sustained during the tax period, unless compensated for by insurance or otherwise, if incurred in a trade or business, or in any
transaction entered into for profit; Rev. Act (1926), § 214 (a) (4, 5, 6), 44 Stat. 26, 27,
26 U.S.C.A. § 955 (a) (4, 5, 6 )(1928); (3) all interest paid or accrued on indebtedness
within the taxable year; Rev. Act (1926), § 214 (a) (2), 44 Stat. 26, 26 U.S.C.A. § 955
(a)

(2)

(1928).

As there is no showing in the case that the taxpayer made these payments as a
part of his business, such payments seem not to fall within the first classification.
"Necessary" means appropriate or helpful; "ordinary" means habitual or normal by
the standards of business custom. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 54 Sup. Ct. 8 (l933).
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue construes "necessary and ordinary" strictly in
the conjunctive; Klein, Federal Income Tax (1929) 395, 396; Montgomery, Federal
Tax Handbook (1932) 294. The federal courts have been inclined to construe it more
liberally. Udolpo Wolfe Co. v. Cont., iS B.T.A. 485 (1929); La. Jockey Club, Inc. v.
Com., 13 B.T.A. 752 (1928). In Harris v. Lucas, 48 F. (2d) 187 (C.C.A. 5 th 193I),
payments made to reimburse former creditors for losses on a compromise settlement
were held deductible. There, however, the payments were made for the express purpose of restoring the credit of the business.
To be deductible under the second classification the payments in controversy must
be construed as a loss incurred in trade or business. Voluntary payments were held not
deductible in Welch v.Helvering, 290 U.S. i I 1, 54 Sup. Ct. 8 (1933) (taxpayer paid obligations of former business associate to strengthen his own credit); Mastin v. Corn., 28
F.(2d) 748 (C.C.A. 8th 1928) (stockholder paid for advertising real estate of the corporation); Bavinger v. Cor., 22 B.T.A. 3239 (i9Ar) (stockholder paid obligations of the
corporation to prevent a petition in bankruptcy); Park,Ex'r v. Cont., 22 B.T.A. 1263
(i93i) (bank president made good embezzlements of cashier); Blackwell Oil Co. v.
Cam., 6o F. (2d) 257 (C.C.A. roth 1932) (corporation paid minority stockholder to
compromise his suit against director). In circumstances similar to Welch v. Helvering,
the Board of Tax Appeals has been more liberal than the other federal courts. In
Herschelv. Jones, i B.T.A. 1226 (1925), a taxpayer was allowed to deduct payment of
a promissory note given by him to reimburse another for loss occasioned by the failure
of a firm of which the taxpayer was a salaried member. The Board gave as its reason
the fact that the payment was not made as a gift and was based on "moral" consideration.
The payments in the principal case do not fall within the third classification because there was no indebtedness at the time the payments were made. Saunders v.
Whitcomb, 177 Mass. 457, 59 N.E. 192 (x9oo). Restatement of the Law of Contracts
(1932), § 423; 1 Williston, Contracts (1921), § 159. The settlement with the creditors
was not a discharge in bankruptcy but an assignment by them of their existing claims.
A subsequent promise to pay a debt discharged in bankruptcy will be enforced by the
courts. Zavelo v. Reevzes, 227 U.S. 625, 33 Sup. Ct. 365, 57 L. Ed. 676 (1913) (judicial
composition); Restatement of the Law of Contracts, § 87; 1 Williston, Contracts
(1921), § 158; contra, Taylor v. Skiles, 113 Tenn. 288, 81 S.W. 1258 (19o4). Payment
in performance of such a promise should be deductible from gross income, at least
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where the new promise was given in the course of a business. See Harrisv. Lucas, 48
F. (2d) 187 (C.C.A. 5th 1931); I Williston, Contracts (1921), § i96.
Although the payment of a debt to be deductible must be an expense or loss connected with a business, the payment of interest need not be on a business debt to be
deductible. Rev. Act (1926), § 214 (a) (2), 44 Stat. 26, 26 U.S.C.A. § 955 (a) (2)
(1928). As a result, at least the payment of interest in the present case would be deductible if an indebtedness exists, whether in connection with carrying on a business
or not.
On the other hand, a new promise made after a voluntary composition agreement
does not create an enforceable obligation, Grant v. Porter,63 N.H. 229 (1884); Depuy v.
Swart, 3 Wend. (N.Y.) 136, 20 Am. Dec. 673 (1829); Taylor v. Hotchkiss, 81 App.
Div. 470, 8o N.Y.S. 1042 (19o3); i Williston, Contracts (1921), § i59.
The federal appellate courts are stricter than the Board of Tax Appeals in applying
the requirement that the loss must have occurred in a transaction entered into for
profit before it is deductible. Goldsboroughv. Burnet, 46 F.(2d) 432 (C.C.A. 4 th I93I).
The instant case is the latest example of this tendency, which seems the better legal
view since the Revenue Act of 1926 requires explicitly that losses to be deductible must
at least have occurred in a transaction entered into for profit. Furthermore it is generally accepted today that the doctrine of moral consideration should have no place
in our law. Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29 (186); Eastwood v. Kenyon, ii A. & E. 438
(1840); Rann v. Hughes, 7 T.R. 350 (a) (1778); but cf. Ga. Civil Code (1926), § 2741,
restricted, however, in Davis v. Morgan, 117 Ga. 5o4, 43 S.E. 732 (1903).
KARL HUBER

Taxation-Presumption of Capacity to Have Issue as Affecting Exemption from
Succession Tax-[Federal].-Testator devised property in trust to pay the income
to his daughter for life, and on her death to transfer the principal to her lawful issue; if
she should have no such issue, then to distribute the property among certain charitable
institutions, bequests to which were exempt under the Revenue Act of 1918, § 403(a)
(3), 40 Stat. 1O98. When testator died, his daughter was fifty years of age, childless,
and had undergone an operation which made it impossible for her to have issue; however, in computing the estate tax the total value of the principal amount bequeathed
was included, since the remainder to the charities was contingent upon the daughter's
death without issue. In a suit to recover the additional tax paid, held, the court need
not conclusively presume that the daughter was capable of having issue, and the tax
should be refunded. United States v. Provident Trust Co., 54 Sup. Ct. 389 (1934).
The court expressly limited its holding to the field of taxation, and emphasized the
fact that the sole question before it was the value of the interest of the charities which'
was exempt from taxation. The decision may have been influenced by the fact that the
life tenant had died before the present suit was brought. See opinion of court below,
ProvidentTrust Co. v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 472 (1933). An earlier federal decision,
on similar facts, had declined to consider evidence as to incapacity to have issue. Farrington v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 30 F.(2d) 915 (C.C.A. Ist 1929), cert. den.
279 U.S. 873, 49 Sup. Ct. 513, 73 L.Ed. roo8 (1929).
The presumption that the capacity to have issue continues throughout a person's
life appears most frequently today in cases involving four classes of problems: (E) the
application of the rule against perpetuities; (2) the time at which a trust may be ter-
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minated; (3) the distribution of property to members of a class; and (4) the marketability of title. That the presumption is conclusive in cases of the first class seems unquestioned, either in the United States or in England. Taylor v. Crosson, ix Del. Ch.
145, 98 Ati. 375 (i916); Reasonerv. Hernman, 191 Ind. 642, 134 N.E. 276 (1922); Jee v.
Audley, i Cox C.C. 324 (1787); see Ward v. Van der Loeff, [1924] A.C. 653, 664; Gray,
Rule Against Perpetuities (3 d ed. 1915), §§ 215, 215a; 32 Mich. L. Rev. 414, 702
(T934); 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 865; 67 A.L.R. 538.

In the other three types of cases, the English courts have held the presumption may
be rebutted by proof of advanced age or evidence of sterility. Urquhartv. Urquhart,24
Scot. L. R. 98 (1886) (trust termination); In re White, [19o1] i Ch. 570 (trust termina-

tion); Leng v. Hodges, Jac. 585 (1822) (distribution of property); In re Belt, 37 L.T.N.S.
272 (1878) (distribution of property); In re Wide Street's Commissioners, 7 Ir. Eq. Rep.
484 (845) (distribution of property); Browne v. Warnock, L.R. 7 Ir. Eq..3 (i88o) (marketable title); but cf. Conduit v. Soane, 24 L.T.N.S. 656 (1871) (trust termination); see
81 Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 879 (933). Thus in the cases in which a court permits distribution
of property the former practice of requiring security for a return of the property in the
event that there should be issue has been abandoned, perhaps because that contingency
has seemingly never materialized. See It re Dawson, 39 Ch. Div. 155, 165 (1888); cf.
Mackenzie v. King, 17 L.J.Ch.N.S. 448 (848). On the other hand, the possibility of
issue will not be treated as extinct if such a result will deprive a living person of a possible property interest. It re Hocking, [1898] 2 Ch. 567. No definite age has been fixed
beyond which the court will consider the presumption rebuttable; but in Groves v.
Groves, 9 L.T.N.S. 533 (1864), where the woman was forty-nine years of age and had
been childless for twenty years, the court refused distribution on the ground that the
precedents were confined to cases involving ages above fifty.
The American courts have apparently refused to admit evidence of incapacity in the
trust termination cases. Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust &sSavings Bank, 182 Cal. 177,
187 Pac. 425 (192o); May v. Bank of Hardinsburg,i5o Ky. 136, 150 S.W. 12 (1912). In
the other two types of cases the courts in this country have split as to the nature of the
presumption. The division of authority is almost even in the cases of distribution of
property. Cf. Hill v. Sangamon Loan & Trust Co., 295 IMI.619, 129 N.E. 554 (192o) and
Riley v. Riley, 92 N.J.Eq. 465, 113 Atl. 777 (1921) (presumption irrebuttable) with
Male v. Williams, 48 N.J.Eq. 33, 2i Atl. 854 (i8gx) andFrankv. Frank, x53 Tenn. 215,
280 S.W. 1012 (1925) (presumption rebuttable). In cases of marketable title, the
weight of authority seemingly follows the rule that the presumption of capacity to have
issue is irrebuttable. Azarch v. Smith, 222 Ky. 566, i S.W. (2d) 968 (1928); Williams v.
Arnziger, 129 Md. 222, 98 Atl. 542 (1916); List v. Rodney, 83 Pa. 483 (1877); contra,
Whitney v. Groo, 4o App. D. C. 496 (1913).
The reason most often given for rejecting evidence as to incapacity to have issue is
the necessity for a definite, clear-cut rule, and the difficulty of determining the exact
age at which capacity to bear children ceases. See May v. Bank of Hardinsburg,x50 Ky.
136, 150 S.W. 12 (1912). As to rebuttal by evidence other than that of age, it is urged
that indelicate situations might often arise; and, perhaps, operations to effect sterility
might be encouraged. Neither argument seems conclusive; see 47 Harv. L. Rev. io6i
Ux934).

The rule is too firmly fixed in the cases on perpetuities to admit of any hope of
change by judicial decision. Its use in the trust cases is perhaps least objectionable,
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since premature termination of trusts is not generally favored. In the other classes of
cases the rule is not as firmly established, and it seems possible the American courts
may adopt a more realistic attitude. The rarity of the reported instances of the birth
of children later in life [see note to Miller v. Macomnb, 26 Wend. (N.Y.) 229 (1841)],
and the experience of the English courts indicate how slight the danger of error would
be in acting on evidence of age alone. Other evidence of equal probative value should
be equally admissible. As a result, it is to be hoped that the decision in the principal
case will be extended generally to other types of evidence and other situations. See 23
Col. L. Rev. 50 (1923).
SAMUEL EISENBERG

Taxation-Retroactive Estate Tax-[New York].-Decedent and his surviving wife
were tenants by the entirety of certain real property, toward the acquisition of which
the wife had contributed nothing, and which had been acquired before New York enacted an estate tax computed on the full value of property owned by tenants by the
entirety. Held, per curiam, the tax levied on the tenancy by the entirety at decedent's
death is constitutional. In re Weiden's Estate, 263 N.Y. 107, 188 N.E. 270 (1933).
It was contended by the executors of decedent's estate that the tax was unconstitutional as a direct tax on property which was not apportioned according to the federal
census. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, If 4; United States v. Blount, 273 U.S. 769, 47 Sup. Ct.
20, 71 L. Ed. 883 (1926); Appeal of Root, 5 B.T.A. 696 (1926); In re Vandergrift's
Estate, 161 Atl. 898 (Pa. Super. 1932); 13 B. U. L. Rev. i41 (1933). This contention is
based on the theory that the exclusive estate in the survivor of a tenant by the entirety
is created at the time of the grant and not at the date of the other tenant's death; hence
no interest is transferred to which an estate tax may attach at death.
Although it may be correct that no technical interest in a tenancy by the entirety is
transferred at the death of one tenant, a very substantial economic interest does come
into existence at that time. Neither of the tenants has exclusive control of the property
as long as the other lives and neither can convey the estate without the other joining.
Ades v. Coplin, X32 Md. 66, io3 Ati. 94 (r918); Gasner v. Pierce, 286 Pa. 529, 134 Atl.
494 (1926); 2 Thompson, Real Property (1924), § 748; i Tiffany, Real Property (2d
ed. 1920), § 194. At the death of one spouse, the full and exclusive enjoyment, use,

possession and control passes to the survivor, and a mere possibility of obtaining the
fee becomes absolute ownership. Tyler v. United States, 33 F. (2d) 724 (C.C.A. 4 th
1929),

affd. 281 U.S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356, 74 L. Ed. 991 (1930); cf. Saltonstall v.

Saltonstall, 276 U.S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct. 225, 72 L. Ed. 565 (1927); Reinecke v. Northern
Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123, 73 L. Ed. 410 (1928); io N.Y. U. L. Quar.
414 (1933);

22

Cal. L. Rev. 277 (1934).

New York has found no difficulty in holding that the interest of a tenant by the entirety is taxable at the death of one spouse where the tax was enacted prior to the creation of the estate. Matter of Dunn, 236 N.Y. 461, 141 N.E. 915 (1923); In re Chase's
Estate, 312 Misc. 684, 183 N.Y.S. 638 (1920); In re Farraud,126 Misc. 59o, 241 N.Y.S.
793 (I926). Prior to It re Lyon's Estate, 233 N.Y. 208, 135 N.E. 247 (1922), the New
York courts had upheld the validity of a tax on one-half the value of the property of a
tenancy by the entirety where the estate had been created prior to the Tax Law of
1916, but the tenant had died after its enactment. Matter of Moebus, 178 App. Div.

RECENT CASES
709, 165 N.Y.S. 887 (1917); In re Beresford's Estate, 183 App. Div. 947, 170 N.Y.S.
xo68 (i918); In re Greim's Estate, 183 N.Y.S. 149 (Sur. Ct. 1920); 26 A.L.R. 1461, 1466.

But New York refused to impose a tax on the surviving tenant's right to exclusive possession at the death of the other spouse where the tax was passed after the tenancy by
the entirety had been created. Matter of Dunn, 236 N.Y. 461, 141 N.E. 915 (1923);
It re Carnegie'sEstate, 203 App. Div. 9i, 196 N.Y.S. 502 (1922), affd. 236 N.Y. 516,
142 N.E. 265 (1922). The courts held such taxes unconstitutional as an arbitrary at-

tempt to diminish the value of an estate fully vested in enjoyment. The court drew
a sharp distinction between tenancies by the entirety and joint tenancies, however, upholding retroactive taxes on the latter. Matter of McKelway, 221 N.Y. i5, 116 N.E.
348 (1917). By the decision in the principal case the New York court has extended the
retroactive scope of the estate tax, without referring to the former decisions thereon.
The decision is based on the federal court's interpretation of the federal estate tax, 43
Stat. 304 (1926), 26 U.S.C.A. § 1094 (e) (1928), which New York substantially adopted
in place of its former inheritance tax. N.Y. Laws (1930), c. 71o, N.Y. Cahill's Cons.
Laws (1931 Supp.), c. 6i, § 249 r. The principal case, however, has gone beyond the
position adopted by the federal courts. In Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 5o Sup.
Ct. 356, 74 L. Ed. o99 (1929), 18 Cal. L. Rev. 302 (1930), i6 Corn. L. Quar. 114
(1930), the estate apparently was created after the enactment of the tax, although the
language adopted by the court is somewhat broader. The objection to a retroactive
tax in Phillipsv. Dime Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 284 U.S. i6o, 52 Sup. Ct. 46, 76 L. Ed.
68 (193) was held untenable because the law which imposed the tax merely increased
the rate of a prior tax which was in operation at the time the tenancy by the entirety
wascreated. ii Ore. L. ev. 213 (1932); 6 St. Johns L. Rev. 418 (1932). InMillikenv.
United States, 283 U.S. 15, 5i Sup. Ct. 324, 75 L. Ed. 809 (1931), the court held that

the creator of the estate by the entirety is deemed to be aware that the rate of an already existing tax may be raised. In Third National Bank & Trust Co. v. White, 287
U.S. 577, 53 Sup. Ct. 290, 77 L. Ed. 505 (1932) the court per curiam held valid a retroactive tax on the interest of a tenant by the entirety, citing Gwinn v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 287 U.S.

224,

53 Sup. Ct. 157, 77 L. Ed.

270

(1932), where the court

held a retroactive tax on a joint tenancy was valid because the joint tenancy could be
terminated by the voluntary act of either tenant. A tenancy by the entirety, however,
may not be terminated by voluntary act of either party. It is significant that the court
in the present case cited both the White and Gwinn cases without comment, although
it had previously differentiated joint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety.
The position which the New York court has taken, however, seems to be a reasonable furtherance of the policy of the legislature to tax arrangements made for the purpose of avoiding taxes on testamentary dispositions. Since the Married Woman's
Property Acts, either spouse may convey to both spouses an estate by the entirety
without going through the formality of a conveyance through a third person, thus
conveniently accomplishing a testamentary disposition of property without paying an
inheritance or estate tax. In re Klatzl's Estate, 2x6 N.Y. 83, i ioN.E. i8x (1915); ltre
Vogelsang's Estate, 122 Misc. 599, 203 N.Y.S. 364 (1924); Boehringer v. Schmid, 133
Misc. 236, 232 N.Y.S. 360 (1928).
GERALDINE W. LUTES
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Vendor and Purchaser-Risk of Loss-[Washington].-The plaintiff agreed in writing to sell without warranties, and the defendant to buy, a warehouse, part of which
was of lighter construction than the remainder and not in compliance with a city
ordinance. The defendant made a part payment upon the execution of the contract
and was to pay the balance in monthly installments, to have possession, and to pay
taxes and insurance. The defendant had been in possession four years and in default
about seven months when the floor of the lighter constructed portion gave way. Both
parties refused to repair; when the plaintiff sued to forfeit the contract and payments
made thereunder and to secure possession, the defendant cross-claimed for rescission.
From a judgment of rescission the plaintiff appealed. Held, that the defendant was entitled to an abatement from the purchase price, but not to a rescission, the loss and consequential partial failure of consideration not being substantial enough to warrant the
latter. CapitalSavings & Loan Association v. COnvey, 27 P. (2d) 136 (Wash. [933).
The prevailing rule places the risk of loss upon the purchaser. Lombard v. Chicago
Sinai Congregation, 64 Ill. 477 (1872); Skinner & Sons Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v.
Houghton, 92 Md. 68, 48 Aft. 85 (igoo); McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186
N.W. 74 (1921); Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. Jr. 349 (x8oi). The justification of this rule is
often stated to be that the purchaser is equitably and beneficially the owner of the
property; but, inasmuch as ownership of the property is divided, such a criterion does
not furnish a sound basis for allocating the risk of loss. 5 Cook, Lectures on Legal Topics (1924), 337, 351-358.
The minority view places the risk of loss upon the holder of the legal title. Gould v.
Murch, 70 Me. 288 (1879); Libian v. LeveMnson, 236 Mass. 221, 128 N.E. 13 (1920);
Powell v. D., S.& G.R.R.R.Co., 12 Ore. 488, 8 Pac. 544 (i885). It is argued that since
the vendor has not yet conveyed the legal title the loss will result in a partial or complete failure of consideration when the time for performance arrives, and hence the
purchaser should be excused from performance. However, since the vendor holds the
legal title for security purposes only as he is privileged to do, and the purchaser has
received substantially that which he has bargained for when he receives possession and
control of the realty, in reality there is no failure of consideration. Moreover, where
the loss is insubstantial the purchaser will not be granted rescission but only an abatement from the purchase price. Phinizy v. Guernsey, iii Ga. 346, 36 S.E. 796 (Igoo).
A third view recently adopted imposes the risk of loss upon the one in possession of
the realty. Appleton Electric Co. v. Rogers, 200 Wis. 331, 228 N.W. 505 (193o); 2 Williston, Contracts (1920), 1784, § 940. But possession as the sole factor in the determination of the allocation of the risk of loss will under certain circumstances lead to
undesirable results and should be only one of the factors in determining upon whom
the risk of loss is to fall; all the facts should be considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances. See Vanneman, Risk of Loss Between Vendor and Purchaser, 8
Minn. L. Rev. 127; 141-142 (3924).
After a period of uncertainty Washington adopted the minority rule with respect
to contracts containing a forfeiture clause. Ashford v. Reese, 132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29
(1925) (three judges dissenting). As was pointed out in the dissenting opinion in that
case, prior decisions of the court did not require the rule adopted and, also, the same
court for other purposes did hold that the vendee has an interest in the property. Subsequently, in an analogous situation in the law of property, the conditional sale of
goods, the Washington court, relying on the reason advanced in the Ashford case, took
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the peculiar position that the risk of loss is not on the buyer in possession, but on the
seller, even though he holds the legal title only for security purposes. Holt Manufacturing Co. v. Jaussaud, 132 Wash. 667, 233 Pac. 35 (1925) (the same three judges dissenting as in the Ashford case). The majority view is contra. O'Neil-Adams Co. v. Eklund, 89 Conn. 232, 93 AtI. 524 (1915); National Cash Register Co. v. South Bay Club
House Assoc., 64 Misc. 125, ii8 N.Y.S. Io44 (igog). See Bogert, Commentaries on
Conditional Sales (1924), U.L.A. 2A i96, § 146.
Prior to the present case it appeared that the Washington court's denial of the position of the vendee of real property as the owner in equity had occurred only in the case
of contracts containing forfeiture clauses. See Schweppe, Rights of a Vendee of Land:
A Further Word on the Washington Law, 2 Wash. L. Rev. i, 9-10 (1926). The report
of the principal case does not indicate that the contract involved contained such a forfeiture clause; if there was in fact no such clause, it is to be regretted that the court did
not seize upon the absence of such clause as affording an opportunity to break away
from a rule that seems harsh and oppressive in its operation and unsound as a matter
of principle.
GEORGE HERBoLSHEIMER

